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[L. A. No. 23098. In Bank.

Oct. 19, 1954.]

ALFRED GAGNE et aI., Respondents, v. BENJAMIN E.
BERTRAN, Appellant.
[1] Contracts-Subject Matter-Warranties.-While for historical
reasons warranties have become identified primarily with
transactions involving sale or furnishing of tangible chattels,
they are not confined to such transactions.
[2] Fraud-Knowledge of Falsity - Innocent Representations.Strict liability may be imposed for innocent misrepresentations
of facts that maker purported to know, that recipient relied
on in matters affecting his economic interests, and that maker
positively affirmed under circumstances that justify conclusion
that he assumed responsibility for their accuracy.
[3] Contracts-Test Hole Driller-Warranties.-Test hole driller
may not be held to strict liability of warrantor where there is
no express warranty agreement, where there is no evidence
to indicate that he assumed responsibility for his statements

[2] See Cal.Jur., Fraud and Deceit, § 25; Am.Jur., Fraud and
Deceit, § 115 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Contracts, § 163a j [2, 5] Fraud,
§18; [6) Fraud, §19; [7] Fraud, §9(3); (8) Fraud, §24; [11,10)
Negligence, § 50; [11,12,14] Damages, § 54; [13] Damages, 130.
41 C.2d-l1
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as to amount of fill on lots tcsted, where no absolute prolliiar.
wnll Inlllie that fClmlta of hill test would be accurate, nnd where
amount of his fee and fact that he was paid by the hour indicates that he was selling service and not insurance.
[4] Id.-Subject Matter-Services.-ln the absence of a warranty. those who sell their services for guidance of others in
their economic, financial and personal affairs are liablt' only
on the basis of negligence or intentional misconduct.
[6] Fraud-Knowledge of Falsity-Innocent Representations.-To
be actionable deceit, representation need not be made with
knowledge of actual falsity, but need only be assertion. as
fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable
ground for believing it to be true. (Civ. Code, § 1710. subd. 2.)
[6] Id.-Intent.-Test hole driller's intent to induce prospective
purchasers to alter their position can be inferrcd from fact
that he made representations as to amount of fill on lots tested
with knowledge that such purchasers would act in reliance on
them.
[7] Id.-Statements of Fact or OpiDion.-False statement by test
hole driller to prospective purchaser, made after drilling holes
and examining soil, that fill was only 12-16 inches in depth. was
statement of fact and not mere expression of opinion.
fS] Id. - Reliance on Representations. - Prospeetive purchasers
had a right to rely on false statement by test hole driller as to
amount of fill on lots tested where he held himself out as an
expert, such purchasers hired him to supply information CODcerning matters of which they were ignorant, and hill un·
equivocal statement necessarily implied that he knew facts
tbat justified his statement.
[9] Negligence-Oare by :£xperts.-Experts have a duty to exercise
ordinary skill and competence of members of their profession,
and failure to discharge such duty will subject them to liability
for negligence.
[10] Id.-Oare by Test Hole Driller.-Test hole driller's duty of
care in performing soil test was established by his contract with
prospective purchasers, and his failure to discharge such duty
was shown by testimony of his employee that employee noticed
evidence of fill 4-5 feet below surface, as well as by testimony
of persons who dug foundation trenches, such testimony indicating that had driller made his test with due care he would
have discovered true extcnt of fill and would not have mnde
false statement that flll was only 12-16 inehes in depth.
[11] Damages-Measure-Torts.-In action by purchasers of realty
against test hole driller for damages all resnlt of reliance ou
[11] See Oal.Jur.2d, Damages, §§ 120, 156 et seq.; Am.Jur., Damages § 65 et seq.
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driller's misrepresentation as to amount uf till on lots tested,
difference bdween actual cost of installation of foundation ani!
what it would have cost had driller's reprc;;clltations been
true, while proper measure of damages if driller had under·
taken to insure that lots had no fill beyond a certain depth.
is not correct measure of damages where driller's undertaking
was limited to due care to determine and report extent of till.
and damages, whether for deceit or negligence, must be meas·
ured by actual losses suffered because of misrepresentation.
(Civ. Code. ~§ 1709. 3333.)
[12] Id. - Measure - Torts.-In action by purchasers of realty
against test hole driller for damages as result of reliance
on driller's misrepresentation as to amount of fill on lots tested,
if property was worth less than they paid for it, driller was
liable for difference; but if lots were worth what purchasers
paid for them, they were not damaged by their purchase. since
even though they would not have bought lots had they known
the truth, they nevertheless received property as valuable as
that with whieh they parted.
[13] Id.-Mitigation - Duty of Injured Party.-Although purchasers of realty suing test hole driller for damages as result
of reliance on driller's misrepresentation as to amount of till
on lots tested had undertaken to build on property before
they discovered extent of fill, they may not be required to
terminate contract in order to mitigate damages where, at
time they discovered the truth, they were so far committed to
their building project that it would be unreasonable to require them to do so.
[14] Id.-Measure-Torts.-In action by purchasers of realty
against test hole driller for damages as result of reliance on
driller's misrepresentation as to amount of fill on lots tested,
costs incurred by them in installation of foundation which
were not caused by driller's information, but were caused by
physical condition of land, may not be recovered.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. J. A. Smith, Judge.· Reversed.
Action for damages for breach of warranty, deceit and
negligence. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed.
Wallace & Cashin, W. W. Wallace and Earl A. Everett
for Appellant.
Nicolas Ferrara for Respondents.
• Assigucd by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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TRAYNOR, J.-The evidence in this case is in sharp
conflict and is considered here in the light most favorable
to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had contracted to buy two unimproved
lots for $8,500 "subject to ... a fill test to be made at buyer's
expense." Plaintiff Joseph Billiet tele,honed defendant that
he had a contract to buy the lots but "would not proceed
with the deal unless we had a test made for fill, and I told
him if he would like to do it, I would like to have him
handle it because he handled my work before, so he said.
e All right, I will take care of it.''' Billiet testified that
between 1939 and 1942 defendant told him that it was his
business to test soil for fill and that he employed defendant
on four different occasions for that purpose. Defendant did
not tell plaintiffs at any time that he was not a geologist
or soil engineer or that plaintiff should get an engineer or
city inspector to check the soil. Defendant fixed the price
for his services at $10 per hour, which plaintiffs agreed to
pay. On March 7, 1947, several days after this telephonr
conversation, defendant sent two employees and a drilling
rig to plaintiffs' lots. Several holes had been drilled when
Billiet arrived at the lots; defendant arrived shortly thereafter. Billiet testified that he remained on the sidewalk
near the street while defendant picked up and examineil
samples of soil at each of the holes drilled. The location.
depth, and number of holes to be drilled were entirely under
the control of defendant. After defendant had examined
samples of soil from each of the holes, he directed his em·
ployees to close the holes and told Billiet that he had "nothin/!
to worry about here. It is perfectly okay . . . . You may gn
12 to 16 inches but that is about all . . . . You have got ;,
normal condition here, for about an 18 inch foundation."
Defendant's employee in charge of the drilling rig testified.,
however, tha:t he observed evidence of fill 4-5 feet deep in
several of the holes, but did not inform either his employer
or plaintiff of that fact. On March 17, 1947, in respolllw
to defendant's invoice, plaintiffs mailed defendant a checl;
for $25 for his services and requested a letter from defendant
stating his "findings" because it might be required by F.R.A.
Defendant replied that "On March 7, 1947 we drilled fivr
16" dia. test holes . . . the holes were drilled to a depth of
5'0 to 6'0 deep, we did not find any evidence of fill othf'r
than on the snrface for about 12" to 16"." Defen(lant's
invoice incltH1<'fl the printrd st.atement that amollg othrr things
he did "test drilling." Billiet testified that in reliance on
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tlefl'ndalll's oral and writ 1('11 statements about 1ht' extent of
the fill they bought the lots for $8,500 and that they would
not have bought them had they known that defendant's statements were erroneous.
After purchasing the lots, plaintiffs decided to erect a
two-story apartment building thereon. They entered into
contracts for the construction of the building and for a loan
to finance the construction. Plaintiffs' contract for the installation of the foundation at a cost of $3,121.40 was based
on defendant's report that there was no fill below 16 inches
and was expressly subject to an additional charge in the
event the contractor encountered "unforeseen conditions such
as fill and extra work is required. . . ." As the first foundation trench was being dug, it was discovered that the lots
contained areas with 3 to 6 feet of fill. When notified by
Billiet of this condition, defendant came to the site, looked
at the trenches that had been dug, and stated that he had
"evidently made a mistake." The depth of the fill required
a much deeper foundation.! than defendant's report had led
plaintiffs to expect.
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover the increased cost
of installing the foundation. Their complaint stated three
alternative theories of recovery: (1) breach of warranty,
~2) deceit, and (3) negligence. The trial court made findings supporting a recovery on each of these theories. It
found, among other things, that defendant held himself out
as being qualified to make soil tests; that defendant repre~ented and warranted to plaintiffs that there was no fill
':eyond 16 inches; that plaintiffs believed and acted in reiance on this representation and warranty, which was untrue;
that defendant made his test for fill negligently and careIessly; that defendant. had no reasonable grounds for believing his representation to be true; that the additional
expenses plaintiffs incurred in the installation of the foundation were proximately caused by defendant's warranty, misrepresentation, and negligence; that plaintiffs did not know
the true depth of the fill until the foundation trenches were
being dug, and that had they known the true depth of the
fill, they would not have purchased the lots. Judgment was
entered awarding plaintiffs $3,093.65, the increased cost of
installing the foundation. Defendant appeals. He challenges
'The 1.08 Angeles Municipal Code. section 91.4807. Table 48-A. requires
the depth ot the foundation for a two-stOl')' building to be 18 inches belGW
IIDdisturbed natural KroWld lurfaee.
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I h(' sl1ffi(·j('lH·Y of IIl(' ('vi\lr'llI'P to support fb(' flnding-s of fad
and ('ont (,tlfls I hat I h(' trial cOlIrt did not apply the proper
measure of rlamag-es. We have concluded that these contentions are, in part. well ~aken, and that the judgment must
be reversed.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY

Plaintiffs contend that defendant unrlertoolt to guarantee
the accuracy of the results of his test, not on the ground
that there was an express warranty agreement, for there is
no evidence of such an agreement, but on the ground that
under the circumstances of this case the law imposes the
strict liability of a warranty.
[1] For historical reasons warranties have become identified primarily with transactions involving the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels (see Prosser, Torts [1941], pp.
739-740; 1 Williston on Sales [rev. ed., 1948J, §§ 195-197),
but they are not confined to such transactions.' [2] Strict
liability has also been imposed for innocent misrepresentations
of facts that the makf'r purported to know, that the recipient
relied on in matters affecting his economic interests, and that
the maker positively affirmed under circumstances that justify
the conclusion that he assumed rf'sponsibility for their accuracy.a
'One who acts as an agent warrants his authority to 80 act. (Rest.,
Agency, ~ 329; Civ. Code, ~ 2342); bailors and leasors warrant certain
qualities of bailed and leased chattels (Kersten v. Young, 52 Cal.App.2d
1, 6·7 [125 P.2d 501]; FUiher v. Pennington, 116 Cal.App. 248, 251 [2
P.2d 518]; in certain cases a contractor warrants the soundness of his
job (Kuitems v Covell, 104 Cal.App.2d 482, 484 [231 P.2d 552]); a
shipowner warrants the seaworthiness of his vessel (Commercial Molasses
Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 110 [62 S.Ct. Hi6,
86 L.Ed. 89]; O. F. NelsO'7l 4' Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 692. 694;
The Arakan, 11 F.2d 791, 792); the owner of s building to be erected
warrants the workability of the architect's plans that he furnishes to the
contractor (Montrose Contracting Co. v. Westchester CO'Unty, 80 F.2d
841, 842; Williston on Contracts [rev. edt 1938] § 1966 and cases cited;
see also McConnell v. Corona City Water Co., 149 Cal. 60, 63 [85 P. 929.
8 L.R.A.N .S. 1l71]); and those in the business of supplying food and
drink warrant the fitness of their products for human consumption (Burr
V. Sherwin· Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 695 f268 P.2d 10411 and cases
cited) .
'(Mayer v. Salazar, 84 Cal. 646, 649·650 [24 P. 597]; Lahay V. City
Nat. Bank of Denver, 15 Colo. 339 [25 P. 704, 705, 22 Am.St.Rep. 407};
Watson v. Jones. 41 Fla. 24] [25 So. 678. 683]; Coolidge v. Rhodes, 199
Ill. 24,32 [64 N.E. 10741; Tott v. Ouggan, 199 Iowa 238 [200 N. W.
411]; Becker v. McKinnie, lOG Kan. 42n [186 P. 496]; Prewett v. Trimble,
92 Ky. 176 [17 S.W. 3;,tl. :l5i, 3(i Am.St.Rep. !}80]; Braley v. Po leer.,
92 Me. 203 [42 A. 362, 364]; New England Foundation Co. v. Elliott
4' Watrous, Inc., 3013 Mass 177,183 [27 N.E.2d 756]; Krause v. Cook,
144 Mich. 365 [108 N.W. 81, 82); Ti.~cllrr v. Bardin, 155 Minn. 361 [194
N.W. 3, 5J; Peterson v. Schaber", 116 Neb. 346 [217 N.W. 586, 587];
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[3] The evidence in the present case does not justify the
impositioll of the strict liability of a warranty. There was
no express warranty agreement, and there is nothing in the
evidence to indicate that defendant assumed responsibility
for the accuracy of his statements. He did not, as did the
defendant in Orawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal.App. 647, 650
[215 P. 573], tender plaintiffs an "absolute promise" that the
results of his test would be accurate. He was not a seller
of property who obligated himself as part of his bargain
to convey property in the condition represented. The amount
of his fee and the fact that he was paid by the hour also
indicate that he was selling service and not insurance. [4] Thus
the general rule is applicable that those who sell their services
for the guidance of others in their economic, financial, and
personal affairs are not liable in the absence of negligence
or intentional misconduct.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECEIT

[6] To be actionable deceit, the representation need not
be made with knowledge of actual falsity, but need only be
an "assertion, as a fact. of that which is not true, by one
who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true"
(Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. 24: Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 38 Ca1.2d
91, 100 [237 P.2d 6561 : Hoffman v. Kirby, 136 Cal. 26. 29 r68

)

¥
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Boocock v. Osmllr, 153 N.Y. 604, 609·610 [47 N.E. 923]; Jacquot v.
Farmers' Straw Ga8 Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482 [249 P. 984, 986·987];
Palmllr v. Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103, 111 [107 N.W. 478]; Lehigh Zinc 4'
Iron Co. v. Bamford, 150 U.S. 665. 673 [14 S.Ct. 219, 37 L.Ed. 1215];
Btein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696, 699; see also Edwarc'la v. Bergi, 137 Cal.
App. 369, 373 [30 P.2d 541] [vendor "presumed" to know the truth];
Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., 305 Mass. 362, 365·367 [25 N.E.2d 740);
Tattl v. Bates 118 N.C. 287 [24 S.E. 482, 483, 54 Am.St.Rep. 7191;
TntBt Co. of Norfolk v. Fletcher, 152 Va. 868 [148 S.E. 785, 788, 73
A.L.R. 1111]; Civ. Code, ~ 1572 [2].) Whether this liability should be
regarded as part of the law of warranty or as a form of deceit (see
Williston," Liability For Hones' Misrepresentation," 24 Harv.L.Rev.
415; Bohlen, "M isreprestlntation as Deceit, N egligence, o~ Warranty,"
42 Harv.L.Rev. 733) we need not now determine. If plaintiffs had alleged
and proved facts that justify its imposition, a mislabelling of their cause
of action would be immaterial. (Code Civ. Proc., ~~ 307. 426.)
'Since the Legislature in this section of the Civil Code has made the
cause of aetion for negligent misrepresentation a form of deceit, statements in a number of cases, contrary to this section and the cases cited
in the text, that scienter is an essential elellwnt of every cause of action
for deceit are erroneous and are therefore disapproved. (See, for example.
Podlasky v. Price, !!7 CaI.App.~d 151, 101 [196 P.2d 6081; Swasey v.
dll L'Etanche, 17 Cal.App.2d 713,716·717 162 P.2d 7531; Palladine v.
Imperial Valley Farm Lands A8sn., 61) Cal.App. 727, 742 [221) P. 2911;
GrislL'old v. .110rrison, :'53 Cal.App. 93, 101 [200 P. 62]; 8meLand v. Be.·
~, 50 Cal.App. 565, 569 [196 P. 283}.)
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P. 321] ; Daley v. Quick. 99 Cal. 179, 182 [33 P. 859] ; Lerner
v. Riverside Citrus Assn., 115 Cal.App.2d 544, 547 [252 P.2d
744] ; Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal.App.2d 926, 930 [245 P.2(1
532] ; Morrell v. Clark, 106 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [234 P.2d
774] ; Graham v. Ellm<We, 135 Cal.App. 129, 132 [26 P.2d
696]; Williams v. Spazier, 134 Cal.App. 340, 345-346 [25
P.2d 851] ; Andrew v. Bankers ct Shippers Ins. Co., 101 Cal.
App. 566, 575 [281 P. 1091J ; Rest., Torts § 552; see also Civ.
Code, § 1572, subd. 2; Horrell v. Santa Pe Tank cf Tower Co.,
117 Cal.App.2d 114, 119 [254 P.2d 893]) and made "with
intent to induce [the recipient] to alter his position to his
injury or his risk.••• " (Civ. Code, § 1709 11 ; Gonsalves v.
Hodgson, supra, 38 Ca1.2d 91,100; Hobarl v. Hobart Estate
Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 422 [159 P.2d 958]; Estate 01 Newhall,
190 Cal. 709, 718 [214 P. 231, 28 A.L.R. 778]; Work v.
Campbell, 164 Cal. 343, 347 [128 P. 943, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 581] ;
Carlson V. Murphy, 8 Cal.App.2d 607,609-612 [47 P.2d 1100].)
[6] Defendant's intent to induce plaintiffs to alter their
position can be inferred from the fact tbat be made tbe representation with knowledge that plaintiffs would act in reliance thereon. (Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239
[135 N.E. 275J ; see also International Products CO. V. Erie
R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 339 [155 N.N. 662, 56 A.L.R. 1377].)
The evidence discloses that defendant's statement was
erroneous, that, as will be shown presently, defendant negligently performed tbe fill test, that his statement was therefore made without reasonable ground for believing it to be
true (see International Products Co. v. Erie R. Co., supra,
244 N.Y. 331, 338), and that plaintiffs justifiably relied on
his statement in purchasing the lots and in making their
contracts for the erection of the building.
Defendant contends, however, that even if his statement
was erroneous, it was not a misrepresentation of fact, but
was only a statement of opinion and thus cannot form the
basis of an action for deceit. [7] Defendant drilled the boles,
'Under this section of the Civil Code the intent required to prove a cause
of action for deceit is an IDtent to IDduee action. AD" intent to deceive"
is not an essential element of the cause of action, and statements ba a
number of eases, contrary to this section and the eases eited in the text,
that such an IDtent is an essential element of deceit are erroneous and are
therefore disapproved. (See, for example, Cardooo V. Bank of America,
1I6 Cal.App.2d 833, 837 (254 P.2d 949]; Hayter Y. Fulmor, 92 Cal.App.
2d 392, 398 [206 P.2d 1101]: BOG& V. Bank of .dmerica, 51 Ca1.App.2d
;'il/i, 598 £1!:li'i P.2d 620]: Griswo/d V. Morrison, supra, 53 Cal.App. 93,
97; 8mB/and Y. llenlvick, Bllpra, 50 Ca1.App. 565, 569; Bod,1k'.. Y.
DII7Illam, 10 Ca1.App. 690, 698 [103 P. 3(1).)
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'·,ami'1I'd till' snil. 1I11.! toll) Billiet that III'> fill WHO; !'Ill.\'
12-Hi inches ill dppth. He' did not. give hiR statement in

the form of an opinion but as a representation of fact. (See
Edward Ban'on Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 573
[126 P. 351, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 125]; Bla·ckman v. Howes, 82
Cal.App.2d 275, 281 [185 P.2d 1019, 174 A.L.R. 1004];
Ha:;erot v. Keller, 67 Cal.App. 659, 670-671 [228 P. 383];
Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farm Lands Assn., 65 Cal.App.
727, 737-739 [225 P. 291].) His assertion was not a casual
expression of belief, but was a deliberate affirmation of the
matters stated and was thus within the statute, which requires
only that he assert, "as a fact, . . . that which is not true.
• • . " [Italics added.} (Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. 2.)
[8] Moreover, even if defendant's statement was an opinion, plaintiffs justifiably relied thereon. Defendant held
himself out as an expert, plaintiffs hired him to supply information cQncerning matters of which they were ignorant,
and his unequivocal statement necessarily implied that he
knew facts that justified his statement. (Seeger v. Odell, 18
Cal.2d 409, 414 [115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291]; Union
FWwer Market, Ltd. v. Southern Cal. Flower Market, Inc.,
10 Cal.2d 671, 676 [76 P.2d 503] ; Harris V. Miller, 196 Cal. 8,
13 [235 P. 981] ; Herdan v. Hanson, 182 Cal. 538. 546 [189
P. 440]; Tracy v. Smith, 175 Cal. 161, 165 [165 P. 535];
Sime v. MaJ.ou/, 95 Cal.App.2d 82, 101 [212 P.2d 946. 213
P.2d 788] ; Eade v. Reich, 120 Cal.App. 32, 35 [7 P.2d 1043] ;
Raserol v. Keller, supra, 67 Cal.App. 659, 670.) The cause
of action for deceit was therefore established by the evidence.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOB NEGLIGENCE

[9] The services of experts are sought because of their
t special skill. They have a duty to exercise the ordinary skill
and competence of members of their profession, and a failure
~ to discharge that duty will subject them to liability for
f negligence. Those who hire such persons are not justified
.f in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care
;:-:,
;. and competence. They purchase service, not insurance.
(PerkiN v. Trueblood, 180 Cal. 437, 441 [181 P. 6421 [physician] ; Speer v. Brown, 26 Cal.App.2d 283. 288, 294 [79 P.2d
179] [physician]; Sim v. Weeks,7 Cal.App.2d 28. 33 [45 P.2d
350] [physician]; Walter v. England, 133 Cal.App. 676. 679
[24 P.2d 930) [dentist]; Page v. Wells, 37 Mich. 415. 421
[timber appraiser] ; Edwa.rds v. Lamb. 69 N.H. 599 [45 A. 480.
50 L.R.A. 160} [physician]; Skilling, v. Allen, 143 MinD.

r
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:123 f173 N.Y. 663, 5 A.L.R. 922J I physician] ; Noble v.
'fibhy. 114 Wis. Ga2, 6:H f12!l N.W. 7911 [timber appraiser).)
[10] Defendant '8 duty of care in prrforming the soH test
was established by his contract with plaintiffs. His failure
to diseharge that duty was established by the testimony of
his employee that the employee noticed evidence of fill 4-5
feet below the surface, as well as by the testimony of the
persons who dug the foundation trenches. This testimony
indicates that had defendant made his test with due care,
he would have discovered the true extent of the fill, and it
supports the inference that defendant made his test in a
careless and negligent manner. Defendant's repeated assertion that he was not qualified to test soil for fill, contrary to
the finding that he so held himself out, and the testimony
of his expert witness that laboratory tests were necessary,
also indicate that defendant did not exercise the ordinary
skill and competence of those in the business of soil testing.
His failure to do so, as found by the trial court, supports
the cause of action for negligence.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES

)

The only question remaining is the measure of damages
to be applied. [11] Plaintiffs contend that the trial court
correctly measured the damages by the difference between
the actual cost of the foundation and what it would have
cost had defendant's representations been true. This measure
would have been a proper one had defendant undertaken to
insure that the lots had no fill beyond 12-16 inches in depth.
As indicated above, however, defendant's undertaking was
limited to exercising due care to determine and report the
extent of the fill, and the damages, whether for deceit or
negligence. must be measured by the actual losses suffered
because of the misrepresentation. (Civ. Code, §§ 1709, 3333;
see also Edward Barron Estate 00. v. W oodruf! 00., 163 Cal.
561, 577-578 [126 P. 351, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 125] ; McCormick on
Damages [1935], p. 449.)
[12] In reliance on defendant's information plaintiffs purchased the property. If the property was worth less than
they paid for it. defendant is liable for the difference. 1I On
"On a retrial of this eause, plaintiffs can amend their complaint to
allege gueh damages and produce evidenee to establish the allegation.
They are also entitled to reeover any consequential damages resuiting from
the purchase of the lots in reliance on defendant's misrepresentations.
(See Bagda..arian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 762-763 [192 P.2d 935];
EdIL"ard Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 577-578 [126
P. 351, d L.B.A.N.8. 125].)

)
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the other hand. if the lots were worth what plaintiffs paid
for them. plaintiffs were not damaged by their purchase. for
even though they \votdd not have bought the lots bad they
known the truth. they nevertheless received property as valu·
able as that with which they parted.
[13] Plaintiffs also undertook to build on the property
before they discovered the extent of the fill. At the time
they discovered the truth. they were 80 far committed to
their building project that it would be unreasonable to require
them to terminate it to mitigate damages. (Bomberger v.
McKelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607. 614 [220 P.2d 729] ; see also Rest..
Contracts. § 336. comment a.)
[14] The additional costs plaintiffs incurred in the installation of the foundation were not caused by defendant's
misinformation. bowever, but by the physical condition of
the land. The true condition was discovered in time to alter
the plans. and it does not appear that plaintiffs had to
abandon any of their work or to undo any of it and start
over. Thus this is not a case in which plaintiffs wholly or
partially completed their building before they discovered the
truth and thereafter had to abandon it or make costly alterations that would not have been required had they known the
true condition of their land at the outset of construction.
Such damages. had they been suffered, would have resulted
direCtly from defendant's failure to report the truth and
would clearly be recoverable. In the present case, plaintiffs
have proved only that they were induced to commit themselves to a building venture and that the cost of the building
exceeded the anticipated cost by $3,093.65. Given the deci·
sion to build, however, these costs would have been incurred
whether or not defendant correctly reported the extent of
the fill, and the question presented is. therefore, whether or
not plaintiffs have proved that they suffered damage as a
result of being induced to build on their property. This
question is basically the same as the question whether or not
they proved that they suffererl damage as a result of being
induced to buy the lots in the first instance.
It may be assumed that lots with 3 to 6 feet of fill would
not be as valuable as ones identical in other respects with
only 12 to 16 inches of fill. Accordingly, by proving that
the fi11 was deeper than defendant had reported. plaintiffs
established that they wt're induced to buy lots that were
. less valuable than they had anticipated. As stated above.
, however, since they did not prove that the lots were worth
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'111' ('xtr;! ,·,,·,1 I.. d"r.·"dllllb; in tl .. llat·!-; 1\1111 "('nll'

;"'isillg' rrlllll

the fact that IIIP ('IlIHiit ion of thp Icmd wa~ 1I0t. as rl'prl's('nlrd
by defendant that plaintiffs seek to recover. I eallnot agree
that defendant did not .. cause" plaintiffs to incur tlles!'
additional expenses so as to render defendant liable therefor.
If defendant had truly reported the condition of the land
plaintiffs would not have purchased it at all.
According to the theory of the majority opinion if plaintiffs
in reliance on defendant's representation had constructed the
building without discovering the truth as to the condition
of the land and if the building, by reason of foundations
inadequate because of the unreported depth of the fill, had
collapsed, plaintiffs could not recover from defendant the cost
of rebuilding or any other sum unless the bare land on the
day it was purchased was worth less than the sum paid for
it, and such difference, if any, would be the exclusive measure
of damages.
Beeause of defendant's misrepresentation plaintiffs purchased the lots, entered into an agreement to pay $3,121.40
for the construction of a foundation, pltts additional charges
if unforeseen conditions such as the existence of a fill deeper
than 16 inches required extra work, and entered into contracts
for the construction of a building and for a loan to finance
the construction. In constructing the foundation the contractor did encounter the unforeseen condition of the deeper
fill and as a result plaintiffs incurred additional expenses
of $3,093.65. Whatever the actual value of the land was at
the time of purchase and whatever the selling price eventually
may be, it is indisputably true that plaintiffs are actually
"out of pocket" the sum of $3,093.65 more as the cost of the
improved property than they would have been if defendant's
representation had been true. In my opinion defendant's
representation should be held to constitute a proximate, legal
cause of plaintiffs' additional cost; in the language of section
3333 the additional cost was "detriment proximately caused
thereby"; the extra eost would not have been incurred if
defendant had not made the false representation.
The effect of the majority opinion is to limit plaintiffs'
recovery to an artificially limited so-called "out-of-pocket"
loss (see Civ. Code, § 3343). In Bagdasarian v. (kagnon
(1948), 31 Ca1.2d 744, 759, 762 [192 P.2d 935J, a majority
of this court held that the artificially limited and inaccurately
designated "out-of-pocket" measure of damages provided for
in section 3343 of the Civil Code and made available to one

I
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If'SS than they paiJ for them, they failed to establish damagl's
flowing from their drci!'lion to bt,y. Similarly, if despite tilt>
additional cost, plaintiffs secured a building that was ,yorth
as much or more than it reasonably cost them to erect. no
damages flowed from their decision to build. Plaintiffs did
not prove that the extent of the fill made the lots unsuitabl!'
for their intended use, or that because of it. the reasonable
cost of their building exceeded its value, and they success·
fully prevented defendant from introducing evidence that
the value of the property as improved exceeded the amount
plaintiffs invested in it. After plaintiffs purchased the lots
they owned property that was suitable for the nse they in·
tended to make of it. Because of defendant's negligenc(>
plaintiffs erroneously believed that it was more suitable for
their purpose than it actually was. '{'he additional expense
they incurred, however, flowed from the condition of thf'il'
land and not from defendant's report as to what that con·
dition was. Thus, although they would not have undertaken
to build had they known the truth, they have not proved
any losses flowing from that decision.
The judgment is reversed.
Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and Bray, J. pro tern.,·
concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-J do not agree with that portion of the
majority opinion which discusses the measure of damages for
defendant's wrong. As indicated in the majority opinion.
the Civil Code (§ 3333) prescribes the measure of damages.
Section 3333. which applies both to an action for negligence
and to one for deceit. provides: "For the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages,
except where otherwise expressly provided by this code. is
the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proxi·
mately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated
or not."
According to the majority opinion, the additional costs
incurred by plaintiffs because the land was filled to a dept h
of 3 to 6 feet, rather than to a depth of 12 to 16 inches HS
reported by defendant. "were not caused by defendant's mi;;·
information . . . but by the physical condit.ion of the lan(]"
BlIt the sole object of the employment of dpfpnilullt by plaill'
tiffs was to ascertain the comlition of the land and it is only
• Alisiarned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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dt'fra'HI<>cl in tJIP. purehaRe, sal<\ or cxehnnge of property, is
the exclusive, rather thall, at th<.' option of the wronged perRon,
an alternafille. measure of dalllages in such a case. Although
1 do not agree with this holding (see my dissent in the
Ba/!dasarian case, p. 764 of 31 Cal.2d), I recognize it as
currently the law of this state. But I cannot approve the
extension of the rule so limiting damages for the benefit of
fraudulent vendors to include in the class of favored persons l
a person such as defendant here who is not by the terms of
the statute within the class. Defendant here is not the fraudulent seller or buyer of property, but one who was employed
as an expert soil engineer or "test driller" to render skilled
personal services: i. e., to do whatever was necessary to ascertain and inform plaintiffs of the true condition as to the
extent of any fill on the property so that they might intelligently and accurately compute the cost of improving it and,
accordingly, determine whether they would buy it and, if so,
how they would improve it.
The measure of responsibility of defendant for the negligent
performance of his obligation and for the false representation
as to the condition of the thing he was employed to ascertain
and report on should certainly be no less than that. for example, of a member of the legal profession who is employed
to examine and report on the condition of title to land proposed to be purchased or accepted as security for a loan. If
the lawyer is incompetent, performs his work in a negligent
manner, and reports a false condition when the true condition
would have been discovered and reported by a competent
lawyer exercising ordinary care, and, as a consequence. the
cHent purchases the property or loans on its security and
'llubsequently finds that the title is already encumbered, is
the client to be denied recovery because (paraphrasing the
language of the majority opinion) ,. the loss he incurred
flowed from the condition of the title to the land and not from
defendant's report as to what that condition was'" As heteinafter shown, the cases establish that the rule is to the
contrary_
It is so well established as to need no citation of authority
'It is to be presumed that the Legislature by enacting Civil Code, see·
tion 3343, intend I'd to provide further (I\nd alternative) protection for
the wronged victim of fraud, but by the judicial interpolation in the
Bngrlasarian case which reads into the statute a provision that it shall be
the exclusive remedy in cases of fraud, tbe court has made a shield for
the wrongdoer out of what was inteuded IlS a aword' for the victim. (See
also 5 Williston on COlltracts (rev. ed.) t 1392, p. 3886.)
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that persons who undertake as experts to perform personal
skilled services and who. either because they do not possess
the skill they claim, or because of negligence. fail to perform
in the manner and with the results that would attend per·
formance with due care by a person of ordinary skill. may
bE' sued either for breach of contract or for negligence, or
where there is actual or constructive fraud, for such fraud.
A nd where the action is ex delicto, exemplary damages may
be recovered upon a showing of frand even though the tort
incidentally involves a breach of contract (Civ. Code, § 3294;
Chelini v. Nieri (1948). 32 Ca1.2d 480. 486 [196 P.2d 915] ;
Haigler v. Donnelly (1941), 18 Ca1.2d 674, 680 [117 P.2d
331 J ). Furthermore, it is to be noted that Civil Code, section
3343. relied upon by the majority in the Bagdasarian case,
expressly provides that "Nothing herein [in § 3343] contained shall be deemed to deny to any person having a cause
of action for fraud or deceit any legal or equitable remedies
to which such person may be entitled. "
An attorney employed to examine the title to real property
must exercise reasonable care and skill in the matter, and
his failure to do so is negligence for which he will be liable
to his client in damages for the loss occasioned. (5 Am.Jur.
338, § 132.) The measure of damages due from an attorney
to his client for negligence in' passing as clear a title encumbered with liens is the amount necessary to payoff the liens,
and this is true regardless of whether the client later sells
the property for a profit. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
states the rule as follows (Jacobsen v. Peterson (1918), 91
N.J.L.404 [103 A. 983, 9841): "The question arises, What
was the measure of damages? Where, as here, an attorney
negligently omits to report the fact of a judgment. which is
a lien upon real estate the title of which he was employed
to investigate. and his client purchases such real estate in
reliance upon such report and without knowledge of such
judgment, the measure of damages is the amount his client
is caused to payout to remove the lien of such judgment.
But it appeared that the plaintiff subsequently sold the real
estate for a sum in excess of its total cost to him, including
the discharge of the judgment, and the trial judge considered
this justified the award of nominal damages only. Not so.
The measure of damages was not affected by the sale. It will
not do to say that in order for a client to recover for such
; negligence he must either sell the property at a loss or not
t.

4%

l;.\U~E V. i;:K"l:,\N

sell it at all, He was entitled to all the profit he would have
made by the transaction if the title had been as represented."
(See aI~o Annotation, 5 A.L.R. 1389, 1394-1395, "Liability of
attorney passing defective title. . .• Measure of damages.")
Here, the condition of the land as to the fill was just as
important to the plaintiffs as was its condition as to title;
if they had bp.en compelled to payoff a judgment lien of
$3,093.65 they would have been no more out of pocket than
they were by reason of having to pay the same sum for the
deeper foundations required by the deeper flll.
The code does not require, and, as shown above, the case law
does not suggest, that damages recoverable for deceit or
negligence from one such as the defendant here who undertakes to perform personal skilled services be limited to the
difference, if any, by which the market value of the land at
the time of purchase is less than the price paid for it. Here
the plaintiffs are actually out of pocket the entire $3,093.65
which they were required to pay over and above the basic
contract price because defendant's representation was not
true. Certainly to plaintiffs the amount of the detriment
which they suffered as a result of defendant's wrong is the
additional amount they were compelled to expend to obtain
what both plaintiffs and defendant had contemplated they
should obtain. I would, therefore. affirm the judgment.
SHENK., Acting C. J .-1 dissent. 1 would affirm the judgment on the ground that under the facts of this case the
detriment suffered by the plaintiffs is, as stated by Mr. Justice
Schauer in his dissent, "the additional amount they were
compelled to expend to obtain what both plaintiffs and
defendant had contemplated they should obtain."
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied November
17, 1954. Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

